"Seriously, imagine Canada offering to host a Chinese or Russian military base and what would immediately occur."
That's a good question, and I think people who say "the USA immediately invades Canada" possibly haven't thought that through well enough. That isn't to say it wouldn't be on the table with any level of certainty, but that would be a much larger step than I think most people grasp.
When applying the Roman Empire model to the US hegemony, it is also worth noting the differences in the direction of resource flow. The US does not seem to collect any tribute from its "client states", and if anything subsidizes them, which is a stark difference from the Roman model. Now possibly that is because the resources are less exciting than the political backing, but then again, Europe doesn't do much to provide military support. Land for bases, sure, but not a lot of auxiliaries.
In all, the modern US hegemony seems like akin to the Roman Empire's model than the model of a celebrity entourage: lots of hangers on who don't seem to contribute much other than "friends" and a group to hang out with, and possibly connections and a couch to crash on now and again. The older, Cold War era model probably was a bit closer to the Roman model, but even then it is a bit questionable. A new paradigm, with some features carried over, might be necessary.
There might be non-obvious taxes from client states, such as the whole international reserve currency thing resulting in higher exchange rates than otherwise. It is very hard to estimate, everybody is just guessing, me included.
I find Bret Devereux's writing about the "Status Quo Coalition" [1] to be more optimistic and more convincing. In particular, the economics of warfare have changed drastically (no longer is agricultural land the basis of wealth), so a direct analogy between the Roman empire and present day seems very crude. Devereux knows enough not to make that mistake.
It's true that if you squint, it's a little bit comparable. In modern times, most countries know that wars of conquest are unprofitable, but not all. This might be sort of like the calculation Roman "allies" made.
But not really the same. You might, for example, notice that many countries actually do have their own foreign policies, substantial disagreements with the US, and don't pay taxes to the US.
U.S. wouldn't need to invade; we and our allies would immediately cripple their economy with trade sanctions. Canada and her leaders would also be victim of a spectacular and humiliating smear campaign across the anglophone media until they got back in line, and who's to say a little old fashioned did-it-really-happen CIA magic wouldn't also be employed for good measure.
Not to mention, Canada pitting herself against the u.k. (via the u.s.) would have weird and potentially politically destabilizing effects in both countries, due to their sharing a sovereign, and possibly in the king's other realms as well.
I have some issue with calling Europe a US client state (or continent I suppose?).
For starters European incentives are largely aligned with the US. Russia is trying to take its land, and China is trying to take its industries. And Chinese control of Taiwan is not in Europe's interest. Furthermore, both the US and Europe are democracies. So value systems are aligned.
There is also a massive difference in the threat that the US poses to Europe. Invading it would be complete political suicide for any US president. And would be logistically challenging, to say the least. So where is the military threat that the Romans had over their border client states?
I do agree that "rules based order" stuff is a load of nonsense though.
If I may be forgiven for delving so far into the past, I think you make a philosophical error here which I have seen often among many people, and which you recognize is an error, but without (I think) fully appreciating its relevance to the very comparison you draw. It is true that the "American empire" or "US hegemony" is scarcely American at all, and America is only one of its conquered territories. Nevertheless, everyone continues to call it by such names, and there is this sense, as you have implied by suggesting that the empire "burst free of [its] host", that it truly was American at some time in the past and has evolved into the monster we see today. This is not the case.
On the contrary, to refer to this beast as the "American empire" would be like referring to the Roman empire as the "Italian empire". Certainly Rome is in Italy, quickly occupied all of Italy, and even deigned to grant all Italics Roman citizenship (when it was felt to be in the interest of Romans), but even the countryside of Latium was no more the center of gravity of the empire than was Syria Palæstina.
One might suppose that it would be fair to say something like "Washingtonian empire", on that basis, but as for me, I find myself fond of the construction, "NYCaean empire", which, after all, evokes its own Greco-Roman comparison, being the "place of victory".
"The definition of a “real” Roman changed over time — at first it was only inhabitants of the city of Rome itself, later it was expanded to the surrounding countryside, and finally to all of Italy. But at every point it was a tiny fraction of the total population of the empire."
A quibble perhaps, but I thought Caracalla extended Roman citizenship to all free human males in the Empire?
Let's see how this post aged. First of all, is having an empire to the advantage of the people who live in the imperial center? I think the answer is complicated. Some can make really good deals by say selling weapons to the state. Some can use that threat to get their hands on resources in the provinces. Some will feel that they are paying taxes to maintain garrisons in far away lands they don't really care about. Empires can get too expensive to maintain. Most European colonial empires in their last decades were, which is why they were given up with relative ease.
It was clear even before Donald Trump's election that his job is to roll the empire back to its natural frontiers, from Panama to Greenland. This of course creates a dangerously unstable international situation, as Russia, China, Iran will try to fill the vacuum left. But then again, endlessly antagonizing Russia was also dangerously unstable.
Continuing to buy Russian gas, for starters. Germany received Soviet gas in the 1980s without any trouble, and the USSR was a dictatorship. Hard to receive gas when the pipeline has been exploded by allies.
>Germany received Soviet gas in the 1980s without any trouble, and the USSR was a dictatorship.
Sounds like being a US client isn't actually that bad? They'll let you buy gas from their big rival no problem.
>Hard to receive gas when the pipeline has been exploded by allies.
I thought it was Ukrainian agents exploding the pipeline?
Trump was the first US president to seriously pressure Germany away from Russian gas, correct? Perhaps your argument is more like: "Being a US client used to be pretty good, but it recently got worse"
In any case, I thought the consensus at this point is that containing Russia is more of an EU interest than a US interest. That's why the EU is attempting to drag the US into sending more weapons to Ukraine and so forth.
Yes, that is exactly what I meant. Some decades ago, it was easier to pretend the USA was an ally instead of a hegemon. Starting in 2022, it became harder.
> I thought it was Ukrainian agents exploding the pipeline?
Pretty plausible that the glove was at least in part Ukrainian. The hand, however, …
> In any case, I thought the consensus at this point is that containing Russia is more of an EU interest than a US interest.
EU interest, probably; European interest, hardly. Cf. the review itself though, noting how the client ruler was kept in place by Rome, not excluding against his own subjects.
Russia is after all Schrödinger’s evil empire: Too shambolic to decisively conquer Ukraine; but also at the channel in three days unless we risk spiralling escalation over Pokrovsk. Some impossible containment.
The problem with compradors in general is that you can hardly expect brilliant people, since it’s an inherently somewhat sordid business, and happy cognitive dissonance is for midwits.
So now they see themselves in a situation that may require flexibility and strategic creativity, and once again: midwits. I think they just keep following the wishes of the ancien DC regime, probably in the hope that MAGA is just a phase and the (re)appearance of Prester John Bolton will relieve them for their faith. Who knows, it might actually happen!
> They'll let you buy gas from their big rival no problem.
The discourse around this is an interesting point in the total loss of the mandate of heaven in Europe.
People acted and act as if it was unthinkable to buy Russian gas since that would be “paying the enemy”. The obvious implication of this is that Russia gets higher strategic value out of selling a primary sector commodity with a global market (i.e., subsidising China by boycotting or at least limiting it) than Europe gets out of higher industrial uses of that energy.
This is either wrongheaded, and midwits was overly generous, or true, and we’re cooked to a degree previously only experienced by British vegetables.
In the end, the Empire is clearly bad for Europeans (this was different in the cold war, but we’re in the extractive phase now) and ambiguously bad for the American masses. It’s hard to enjoy the reserve currency subsidy when you can’t have a stable, productive (i.e. mostly manufacturing, for most classes) job – hence, Trump. Hard to tell for Asians. Taiwan needs protection, but OTOH I’m pretty sure the main reason they don’t have nukes yet is that the Empire won’t let them.
The problem with getting rid of it (apart from the dubious feasibility of such an undertaking!) is that all the working institutions within it are so inextricably bound up with it, while the settlements it created are so inorganic in places (e.g. Balkans) that the vacuum during any rollback would create huge dangers. OTOH it’s clearly stumbling, at a level of too big to fail that there’s nothing even bigger to catch it.
I think this is a big problem with the usual “muh institushons” thinking in general: Institutions go bad, and they inevitably go bad in a way that they’re too hardened and brittle to be pared back without shattering when they reach a level of dysfunction where people actually want to pare them back.
Excellent essay. Incidentally, this is the earliest use I’m personally aware of of “Grand Strategy” as an expression (I’m sure there are earlier that I don’t know). I tend to associate it with Paradox Interactive’s series of historical themed strategy games.
"Seriously, imagine Canada offering to host a Chinese or Russian military base and what would immediately occur."
That's a good question, and I think people who say "the USA immediately invades Canada" possibly haven't thought that through well enough. That isn't to say it wouldn't be on the table with any level of certainty, but that would be a much larger step than I think most people grasp.
When applying the Roman Empire model to the US hegemony, it is also worth noting the differences in the direction of resource flow. The US does not seem to collect any tribute from its "client states", and if anything subsidizes them, which is a stark difference from the Roman model. Now possibly that is because the resources are less exciting than the political backing, but then again, Europe doesn't do much to provide military support. Land for bases, sure, but not a lot of auxiliaries.
In all, the modern US hegemony seems like akin to the Roman Empire's model than the model of a celebrity entourage: lots of hangers on who don't seem to contribute much other than "friends" and a group to hang out with, and possibly connections and a couch to crash on now and again. The older, Cold War era model probably was a bit closer to the Roman model, but even then it is a bit questionable. A new paradigm, with some features carried over, might be necessary.
Great review again, much appreciated!
There might be non-obvious taxes from client states, such as the whole international reserve currency thing resulting in higher exchange rates than otherwise. It is very hard to estimate, everybody is just guessing, me included.
I find Bret Devereux's writing about the "Status Quo Coalition" [1] to be more optimistic and more convincing. In particular, the economics of warfare have changed drastically (no longer is agricultural land the basis of wealth), so a direct analogy between the Roman empire and present day seems very crude. Devereux knows enough not to make that mistake.
It's true that if you squint, it's a little bit comparable. In modern times, most countries know that wars of conquest are unprofitable, but not all. This might be sort of like the calculation Roman "allies" made.
But not really the same. You might, for example, notice that many countries actually do have their own foreign policies, substantial disagreements with the US, and don't pay taxes to the US.
[1] https://acoup.blog/2023/07/07/collections-the-status-quo-coalition/
I also immediately thought of Bret's essay, but in contrast to his many other excellent pieces, the Status Quo Coalition did not convince me at all.
U.S. wouldn't need to invade; we and our allies would immediately cripple their economy with trade sanctions. Canada and her leaders would also be victim of a spectacular and humiliating smear campaign across the anglophone media until they got back in line, and who's to say a little old fashioned did-it-really-happen CIA magic wouldn't also be employed for good measure.
Not to mention, Canada pitting herself against the u.k. (via the u.s.) would have weird and potentially politically destabilizing effects in both countries, due to their sharing a sovereign, and possibly in the king's other realms as well.
If you want an example of such a situation, look at what happened with the invasion of Grenada in the 1980s.
Sorry, this was meant to be a reply to doctor hammers comment about what would happen if Canada offered to host a Chinese or Russian military base
The bit about Canada hits different in 2025
I have some issue with calling Europe a US client state (or continent I suppose?).
For starters European incentives are largely aligned with the US. Russia is trying to take its land, and China is trying to take its industries. And Chinese control of Taiwan is not in Europe's interest. Furthermore, both the US and Europe are democracies. So value systems are aligned.
There is also a massive difference in the threat that the US poses to Europe. Invading it would be complete political suicide for any US president. And would be logistically challenging, to say the least. So where is the military threat that the Romans had over their border client states?
I do agree that "rules based order" stuff is a load of nonsense though.
Luttwak doesn't much mention Roman Britain as I understand it - the Antonine wall/Hadrians Wall part obviously but not that much more..
It might be interesting to read this as as a kind of sequel - https://www.amazon.com/Fall-Roman-Britain-Speak-English-ebook/dp/B0B3KWTSYG/
If I may be forgiven for delving so far into the past, I think you make a philosophical error here which I have seen often among many people, and which you recognize is an error, but without (I think) fully appreciating its relevance to the very comparison you draw. It is true that the "American empire" or "US hegemony" is scarcely American at all, and America is only one of its conquered territories. Nevertheless, everyone continues to call it by such names, and there is this sense, as you have implied by suggesting that the empire "burst free of [its] host", that it truly was American at some time in the past and has evolved into the monster we see today. This is not the case.
On the contrary, to refer to this beast as the "American empire" would be like referring to the Roman empire as the "Italian empire". Certainly Rome is in Italy, quickly occupied all of Italy, and even deigned to grant all Italics Roman citizenship (when it was felt to be in the interest of Romans), but even the countryside of Latium was no more the center of gravity of the empire than was Syria Palæstina.
One might suppose that it would be fair to say something like "Washingtonian empire", on that basis, but as for me, I find myself fond of the construction, "NYCaean empire", which, after all, evokes its own Greco-Roman comparison, being the "place of victory".
Luttwak also distinguishes between de facto and de jure independence in his earlier book Coup d'État.
He says that a country needs to be actually independent for a coup to be feasible, otherwise the actually governing country will just stop it.
"The definition of a “real” Roman changed over time — at first it was only inhabitants of the city of Rome itself, later it was expanded to the surrounding countryside, and finally to all of Italy. But at every point it was a tiny fraction of the total population of the empire."
A quibble perhaps, but I thought Caracalla extended Roman citizenship to all free human males in the Empire?
Let's see how this post aged. First of all, is having an empire to the advantage of the people who live in the imperial center? I think the answer is complicated. Some can make really good deals by say selling weapons to the state. Some can use that threat to get their hands on resources in the provinces. Some will feel that they are paying taxes to maintain garrisons in far away lands they don't really care about. Empires can get too expensive to maintain. Most European colonial empires in their last decades were, which is why they were given up with relative ease.
It was clear even before Donald Trump's election that his job is to roll the empire back to its natural frontiers, from Panama to Greenland. This of course creates a dangerously unstable international situation, as Russia, China, Iran will try to fill the vacuum left. But then again, endlessly antagonizing Russia was also dangerously unstable.
Thanks for this essay! I have a hunch that you won't find many Europeans harboring any doubts about their client relationship to the USA.
What specific policies would Europe pursue if they weren't US clients? What's the most vivid example of European interests being subordinated?
Continuing to buy Russian gas, for starters. Germany received Soviet gas in the 1980s without any trouble, and the USSR was a dictatorship. Hard to receive gas when the pipeline has been exploded by allies.
>Germany received Soviet gas in the 1980s without any trouble, and the USSR was a dictatorship.
Sounds like being a US client isn't actually that bad? They'll let you buy gas from their big rival no problem.
>Hard to receive gas when the pipeline has been exploded by allies.
I thought it was Ukrainian agents exploding the pipeline?
Trump was the first US president to seriously pressure Germany away from Russian gas, correct? Perhaps your argument is more like: "Being a US client used to be pretty good, but it recently got worse"
In any case, I thought the consensus at this point is that containing Russia is more of an EU interest than a US interest. That's why the EU is attempting to drag the US into sending more weapons to Ukraine and so forth.
Yes, that is exactly what I meant. Some decades ago, it was easier to pretend the USA was an ally instead of a hegemon. Starting in 2022, it became harder.
> I thought it was Ukrainian agents exploding the pipeline?
Pretty plausible that the glove was at least in part Ukrainian. The hand, however, …
> In any case, I thought the consensus at this point is that containing Russia is more of an EU interest than a US interest.
EU interest, probably; European interest, hardly. Cf. the review itself though, noting how the client ruler was kept in place by Rome, not excluding against his own subjects.
Russia is after all Schrödinger’s evil empire: Too shambolic to decisively conquer Ukraine; but also at the channel in three days unless we risk spiralling escalation over Pokrovsk. Some impossible containment.
The problem with compradors in general is that you can hardly expect brilliant people, since it’s an inherently somewhat sordid business, and happy cognitive dissonance is for midwits.
So now they see themselves in a situation that may require flexibility and strategic creativity, and once again: midwits. I think they just keep following the wishes of the ancien DC regime, probably in the hope that MAGA is just a phase and the (re)appearance of Prester John Bolton will relieve them for their faith. Who knows, it might actually happen!
> They'll let you buy gas from their big rival no problem.
The discourse around this is an interesting point in the total loss of the mandate of heaven in Europe.
People acted and act as if it was unthinkable to buy Russian gas since that would be “paying the enemy”. The obvious implication of this is that Russia gets higher strategic value out of selling a primary sector commodity with a global market (i.e., subsidising China by boycotting or at least limiting it) than Europe gets out of higher industrial uses of that energy.
This is either wrongheaded, and midwits was overly generous, or true, and we’re cooked to a degree previously only experienced by British vegetables.
In the end, the Empire is clearly bad for Europeans (this was different in the cold war, but we’re in the extractive phase now) and ambiguously bad for the American masses. It’s hard to enjoy the reserve currency subsidy when you can’t have a stable, productive (i.e. mostly manufacturing, for most classes) job – hence, Trump. Hard to tell for Asians. Taiwan needs protection, but OTOH I’m pretty sure the main reason they don’t have nukes yet is that the Empire won’t let them.
The problem with getting rid of it (apart from the dubious feasibility of such an undertaking!) is that all the working institutions within it are so inextricably bound up with it, while the settlements it created are so inorganic in places (e.g. Balkans) that the vacuum during any rollback would create huge dangers. OTOH it’s clearly stumbling, at a level of too big to fail that there’s nothing even bigger to catch it.
I think this is a big problem with the usual “muh institushons” thinking in general: Institutions go bad, and they inevitably go bad in a way that they’re too hardened and brittle to be pared back without shattering when they reach a level of dysfunction where people actually want to pare them back.
Excellent essay. Incidentally, this is the earliest use I’m personally aware of of “Grand Strategy” as an expression (I’m sure there are earlier that I don’t know). I tend to associate it with Paradox Interactive’s series of historical themed strategy games.
This was excellent, thank you.
As always thank you for sharing!